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Punching Above its Weight? New Directions in Australian Foreign Policy
Since 1996
(Forthcoming in the South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2003/04, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004)
John McKay*
In many countries, the debate about the legitimacy and desirability of the US-led invasion of Iraq has deeply divided public opinion, and in this respect Australia is certainly not an exception. But in Australia what this intense disputation has done is to highlight important differences in approaches to foreign policy that have in fact been apparent since the victory of the Liberal/National Party Coalition in the election of 1996. A number of commentators, myself included, have argued that we have seen in recent years nothing less than a revolution in Australian foreign policy directions and methods. What is in dispute is whether these new directions are an appropriate response to the realities of the post-September 11 and post-Iraq War world. In particular, there is intense disagreement about the very close support that the Australian government led by Prime Minister John Howard has given to the strategies being adopted by President George W. Bush, and whether this solidarity with the US is causing severe problems between Australia and a number of its neighbours in Asia. In this short paper I want to share with you some of the major features of these intense differences of opinion, draw some lessons about the most effective policy responses of middle powers such as Australia. Certainly, the Australian position on foreign affairs, the war on terrorism, and the “axis of evil” has been quite high profile, confrontational even, and the claim of the government is that Australia is now “punching above its weight” in the international arena. On the other hand, many have argued that Australia is in fact “shooting itself in the foot” by destroying many of the key regional relationships that have been carefully nurtured by successive governments over several decades.
The Old Consensus on Foreign Policy
For much of the period since the late 1960s at least, there has been general agreement about the general aims of Australian foreign policy and about the general nature of its preferred stance within the international community. In particular, Australia was one of the pioneers of what has become known as the philosophy of middle power activism. This approach was based upon the recognition that Australia is not a large country, and hence is not able to neither generate large defence budgets nor apply strong economic leverage. On the other hand, it is relatively rich, and is certainly influential within its region. In an era which since the Second World War has been dominated by a small number of major powers, and in which there has been great concern for a large number of small, impoverished nations, the limited number of relatively affluent yet unthreatening middle powers have been regarded as symbols of hope, able to make significant contributions to the development of a more benign world order. It was argued that in some senses the middle powers have greater freedom of movement and action. They can ask questions and pursue innovative policies that are not open to the bigger players. In particular, medium powers can afford to take morally superior positions, to lead ethical crusades, to act as a conscience for the world (McKay, 1996). This is certainly the role that the Scandinavian countries in particular have played very astutely. Cooper et al. (1993) have suggested that there are three distinct aspects to the constructive role that such middle powers can play:
1. Catalyst – providing intellectual and political energy to trigger initiatives and build coalitions;
2. Facilitator – developing agendas for action, cementing coalitions to leverage power, planning, convening formative meetings and setting priorities;
3. Manager – taking the central role in building institutions, developing monitoring systems, secretariats and other bureaucratic systems, creating confidence- building systems and liaison systems.
Middle powers can also act as bridges between different groups (see also Cooper, 1997). In the Australian context, it has often been suggested that the country, with its strong historical and cultural links with Europe and North America, but with its strong interest in Asia, can act as a link between East and West. Thus, the choice is not between history and geography – the two can act together to define a unique role.
At various times, successive Australian governments have followed this path of middle power activism (Ravenhill, 1998), not always successfully, but with some notable contributions, as in the case of the Cambodian peace process and in the foundation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). A useful insight into the best ways in which middle powers can maximize their leverage is provided in a book by former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (Evans & Grant, 1995). The authors argue that the key is to build effective coalitions of like-minded nations. Care must be taken in identifying opportunities for effective action – ideas that are premature or over-ambitious will not succeed. Sufficient capacity must be available to follow the issue through, hence only a limited number of projects should be pursued at one time. There must be clear and innovative ideas which can be applied, and middle powers may demonstrate quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork not possible for big powers. Finally, the initiating country must have credibility and not be perceived as either hypocritical, threatening or self-seeking.
One of the recurring themes here then is the support for multilateral approaches, and using these to generate coalitions for action. This has certainly been a hallmark of Australian action for many years, and the nation has been seen as one of the most ardent supporters of the United Nations system.
There were some other specific dimensions of the old consensus on foreign policy. Most notable here has been an emphasis on relations with Asia, now the recipient of some two-thirds of Australian exports. But the relationship was not simply a matter of trade, and increasingly Australia developed critical security ties with Asia, culminating in the signing of a defence arrangement with Indonesia during the period of the Keating government. In Paul Keating’s famous phrase, Australia sought security in Asia, not from Asia. This is not to suggest that the relationship with the United States was hostile or devalued, rather it was a sensitive question of balance.
In recent set of lectures broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Owen Harries (2004) has argued that historically we can recognise three major traditions in Australian foreign policy:
1. A realist, power and interest based tradition, identified with former Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies. Abstract general schemes are less important here than pure pragmatics and interests. The world is by nature a very unstable and dangerous place, and it is Australia’s interests to enjoy good relations with dominant powers such as the United States. John Howard also falls into this tradition, more so than any Australian leader since Menzies.
2. A nationalist and internationalist tradition, identified with leaders such as Dr. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister immediately after the Second World War, who was closely involved in establishing the United Nations system. This tradition assertively and energetically tries to develop a high profile position for Australia in international matters, and seeks to define a clear and independent set of policies. Independence and freedom of action for middle powers such as Australia are best sought through international organizations. The emphasis here is on building the machinery of such organizations and defining the architecture of the international system.
3. A regional affairs tradition, identified with Labor Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam and Paul Keating and with former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. The emphasis here is on the need to build links with Australia’s regional neighbours, especially in Asia.
As Harries notes, the question in Australian foreign policy formulation has not been on which of these traditions is right or wrong, but on how to balance the competing demands of these imperatives. Harries then goes on to argue that the particular balance decided upon by the current Australian government has been quite extreme:
Against this background, what can be said about the policy of the Howard government since 2002? That has been a policy of unhesitating, unqualified and – given the attitude of many other states – conspicuous support for the United States in its wars against terrorism and against Iraq. As such it is a policy that can be and has been defended both on the Menziean grounds – that is, protecting one’s own security and paying one’s insurance premium to a great and powerful friend – and in terms of our values, given that it was tyranny and terror that were being combated. Many people whom I respect have found this combination of arguments a compelling one, demanding support for the policy of the Howard government. I would like to explain why, on realist grounds, I have not.
(Harries, 2004, 83-4)
The support for the Howard strategy that Harries refers to, has been based on the basic conviction that the world has changed dramatically and permanently since the attack on the World Trade Centre. The US, it is argued, has responded very assertively to eh new environment, showing a willingness to use its overwhelming economic and military power to defeat what it sees as a fundamental threat to its existence and pre-eminent position. Howard, it is argued, sensed this earlier than many other leaders, and saw that it was in Australia’s interests to deepen its special relationship with the global hyper-power. Australia’s tradition of strong support for the United Nations needed to be modified, it was argued because the UN was patently incapable of dealing with the threats inherent to the new environment. Howard has also argued that Australia’s economic interests would be best served by developing closer ties with the giant American economy, and that political support for the US position would be rewarded with trade and economic benefits.
These arguments were strengthened after 9/11, but in reality they were not new. After the Howard government came to power in 1996, they soon signaled their intention to rebalance foreign policy away form what they saw as an undue emphasis on relations with Asia. In the first White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy (Australia, 1997) the global dimensions of foreign policy were emphasized, rejecting the idea that we should with draw for the global economic and political debate in favour of a limited concentration on the immediate region, and this message was taken a stage further in the more recent White Paper (Australia, 2003). From the outset, this second report stressed the nature of Australian values of “tolerance, perseverance and mate ship”. These define the spirit of the nation, as does the idea of liberal democracy, and are at the core of foreign policy. The relationship with United States is given great prominence, and central here is the conviction that no other country can match the reach of the US in global affairs. Thus the desire to negotiate an Australia-US free trade agreement became a centre point of both economic and strategic policy.
The counter arguments put forward by Harries and others have revolved around a series of different themes, but perhaps the most frequently discussed problem has been what some commentators see as the deteriorating relations with our regional neighbours. A number of recent studies have criticized the performance of the current government within the region. Alison Broinowski (2003) and others have argued that Asian leaders have been deeply disturbed by Australia’s close identification with the United States in recent years. Particularly damaging was the so-called “Deputy Sheriff” interview that John Howard gave to the Bulletin magazine. In the immediate aftermath of the Australian intervention in East Timor to prevent further violence by the pro-Indonesia militia, Howard basked in the success of the operation by Australian troops. This in itself was bad enough for some Asian commentators, who resented what they saw as undue triumphalism. But to make matters much worse, Howard was reported as saying that this was just the sort of contribution that Australia could make in its region to the global effort, acting as a local “deputy sheriff” to the United States. The outcry in the region was immediate and very shrill, and after five days Howard denied that he had ever used the phrase, and that he had been misquoted, but by then the damage had been done. Australia is even now chided as the “deputy sheriff” by critics such as Dr. Mahathir, the recently retired leader of Malaysia. The Howard government has pointed out that there have been some important successes in Australia’s relations with Asia, notably the signing of a $AU 26 billion deal with China to supply natural gas. Much has also been made of the symbolism of inviting Chinese President Hu Jintao to address a joint sitting of the Australian Parliament only a day after President Bush was accorded a similar honour, reportedly much to consternation of the US government. However, as a frequent traveller in Asia, and a regular delegate to APEC meetings, it is my clear view that Australia-Asia relations have indeed been seriously damaged in recent years.
Also important has been a questioning of the real extent of US power and influence in the world and of its willingness to use the power that it undoubtedly does have to assist Australia. Reus-Smit (2003) has suggested that in spite of its material power, the US is in fact less able to mould the world to its needs than it was in 1946. He sees three fatal flaws in US strategy. First, the assumed relationship between material preponderance and effective political power is very problematic. Based on this assumption, other more effective methods of influence, notably diplomatic skill and patience, have been neglected. Secondly, the US government has an impoverished understanding of legitimacy, and has the mistaken belief that the world will support US initiatives because US values are universal. Thirdly, the importance of the cultural magnetism of the US has been greatly exaggerated, and the nature and potency of ‘soft power’ has been misunderstood (see also, Camilleri, 2003). In any case, several critics have argued, blind Australian support will not necessarily translate into reciprocal support from the US. Harries and others have quote the famous remark of Charles de Gaulle that great powers are “cold monsters” and gratitude is not one of their principal motivators.
As I complete this paper, skepticism about the extent to which the US will reward Australian faithful support has been given added impetus by the news that Howard has accepted the terms of a “free trade” agreement with the US that gives no improved access to the US market for Australian sugar, and increases above the current quotas for beef only after a transition period of 18 years. The cartoonists are having a field day. A recent cartoon in The Australian, on Australia Day 2004, depicts two tourists admiring the fireworks display over Sydney habour, but a passing resident tells them that this is nothing; they should see the real display on July 4th, “Dependence Day”!
Debate over the widely perceived failure of the government to gain trade concessions from President Bush in spite of Australian fidelity to US interests is bound to be a key talking point in coming months, and looms as key issue in the next general election, which must be held in late 2004 or early 2005. Also, doubts coming out of Britain and the United States about the accuracy of the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq, in which Australian troops were part of the “Coalition of the Willing”, are also having an impact in Australia. There are now increasing calls for a return to the middle power activism of the recent past, at a time when there is perceived need to strengthen rather than ignore international and multilateral organizations.
References
Australia (1997) In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Australia (2003) Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Broinowski, A. (2003) About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, Melbourne: Scribe.
Camilleri, J. (2003) “A Leap into the Past – in the Name of the ‘National Interest ‘”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57, 431-454.
Cooper, A. (1997) “Niche Diplomacy: a Conceptual Overview” in Cooper, A. (ed.) Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1-24.
Cooper, A., Higgot, R. & Nossal, K. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Harries, O. (2004) Benign or Imperial? Reflections on American Hegemony, Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
Evans, G. & Grant, B. (1995) Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990’s, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
McKay, J. (1996) “Australia as an Asian Middle Power: The Search for a New Role”, Korean Journal of International Studies, 27, 1-28.
Ravenhill, J. (1989) “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52, 309-327.
Reus-Smit, C. (2003) “The Misleading Mystique of America’s Material Power”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57, 423-430.
*Professor John McKay is Director of the Australian APEC Study Centre, and a Partner in Analysis International, a new research institute and think tank based in Melbourne.